College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Popular Media

Faculty and Deans

1984

Federal Courts are Becoming Reluctant to Take the
Lead in Civil Rights Reform
Neal Devins
William & Mary Law School, nedevi@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Devins, Neal, "Federal Courts are Becoming Reluctant to Take the Lead in Civil Rights Reform" (1984). Popular Media. 336.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media/336

Copyright c 1984 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media

88

J\ inormhrr 'lH, /!JH.I

WE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER E/JUCA 'nON

oint of View
By Necr/

.

D~•·ins

Federal Courts Are Becoming Reluctartt
to Ta/u.the Lead in Civil-Rights Riform
In two recent decisions, judges have served notice they are shifting the burden to other branches of ~overnmen t

~

OURTS ARE BEGINNING tO play a less signifi·
'Cant rol e in civil-rights reform in higher education . In February. the Supre me Court
ruled in Gm••• City Co/1•11• v. Bell that the
prohibition in Title IX of the !Education Amendments
of 1972 against sex discrimination extends only to the
specific "education program or activit y" receiv ing fed ·
eral financial assistance. In September. a fedeml up·
peals court suggested in Adams v. B•ll that the Department of Education' s nondiscrimination standards are
not subject to judicial cha lle~ge . Taken together. the
two cases demonstrate an increasing reluctance on the
part of federal courts to take the lead in civil-rights
reform.
In Grm·• Ciry. the Supreme Court refused to read
systemwide coverdgc into l'atutory language that
spoke in terms of any " prognm or activity" receiving
ftderal money. Since the only fedeml dollars that
Grove City College received came through its student aid office. the Court concluded th,at Title IX 's prohihi·
tion a8ainst sex discriminatio n applied only to that of·
fice.
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In its interpretation . the Court ignored events subse-

quent to the passage of the i972 Education Amendments that ~ uggested that Congn:ss was aware of the
"systemwide" application of [Tille IX under the Ford
and Carter Administmtions. Instead of making use
such evidence to extend Title IX's coverdgc. the Court
ruled that a more limited reading was necessitated hy
the " plain language" of the stluute and the legislative
act ivity related to its passage. This portion of the Grtll'<'
Ciry decision follows ge.ner•ll y accepted judicial pmclice. since courts' slatutory Interpretations arc supposed to determine CongresS' s intent at the . time it
enacted a piece of legislation .
The Grm·e
Court can be criticized for deciding
this issue at all si.nce,therc was no dispute !>£tween the
government and the col~ege on this matter. Yet. the
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Court's statutory inlerpretation was 11nrcmarkable.

The Grort• Cily ruling. however. was the cause of great
ire in the civil-rights community . because . unlike a host
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of earlier fedeml-court decisions broadly interpreting
civil-rights legislation . the Court refused to extend Title IX cover•ge beyontl Congn:ss's original intent. The
Court thus left it for Congre"' either to modify or to
leave alone the Gron• Cit \' decision.
Adams v. B~//also demonstrates the judiciary's current n:luctance to supply legislative judgments. In Adams, the Court of Appeals fo n the District of Columbia
questioned-for the first time in this 14-year-old lawsuit-the ability of the NAACP ILegal Defense Fund and
others to challenge the adequ• cy of the Department of
Education' s enforcement of civil-rights laws. The appellate court said that civil-rights groups might lack
" standing"-that is. their clai ms might lack the con·
crete ness necessary to justify judicial relief.
Feder•l courts cannot order relief under a number.of
circumstances. AI a minimt m. for ( Xample . adversary
parties must exist and the plaintiff must have suffered
an injury. The courts are supposed to insist that those
minimum requirements be mtst: the judiciary functions
to settle disputes. not to make fedeml policy.
These limiting considerdtions are especially pertinent in lawsuits challenging lthe particular progmms
that agencies establish to canry out their legal obliga·
tions. In fact. the Supreme Court held in a July 191!4
decision that "such suits. even when premised in iillegations of several instances of violations of law. arc
rarely if ever appropriate for fede r•l·court adjudica-

tion ... The Court based that rulin g on its bel ief th at
couns should not serve as ··continuing monitors of the
wisdom and soundness of Executive act ion. ·· Such supervision. according to the Court . is appropriate fur
Congress.
The federal appeals court th at heard the Adam.<case
closel y followed the Supreme Court ' s ruling and nullified a 1983 district-court order that set deadlines for the
Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights to
handle complaints and compliance re views. Those
dead lines applied to all of the civil-rights office's re·
sponsibilities. including enforcement of Title VI of the
1964 Civil Righls Act (prohibiting race di'\criminationl.
Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments Cprohihiting sex discrimination!. and Section 504 of the 1973
Rehabilitation Act !prohibiting discrimination against
the handicapped).
The Department of Education had said that the districl court 's requirements violated the fundamental
principles of sepamtion of powers. us urped legitimate
management functions belonging to the executive
bmnch. and were unworkable and counterproductive.
Civil-rights groups. however. felt that judicial monitoring of executive functions was necessary to insure ade·
quate enforcement of civil-rights legislation. The appellate court . by suggesting that the plaintiffs were with·
out standing. did not have to address the government's
complaint that the deadlines were unworkable and unconstitutional.
'
HE APPEALS COURT that heard Adam.< was
correct in its concem that courts should not
serve as mechanisms "to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Bmnch to fulfill its duties ... Although the 1964
Civil Rights Act unambiguously provides people the
right to challenge an agency's decision to continue fi.
nancing an allegedly discriminatory system or institution of higher education. that right should extend no
further than challenges of a government decision affecting a ·particular institution . by a person directly
affected by the institution's allegedly discriminatory
pmctices. Otherwise. court s become supemgencies. in
effect running our government.
Adams. with its 14-year history. is a prime example
of how j udicial fiat can dominate agenc y prdctice . Under a consent decree during the Carter Administration
between the Department of Education and civil-rights
plaintiffs. fedeml courts were granted authority to
monitor the progmm components and goals of desegre·
galion plans. Each state was required to define the
mission of each institution in the higher-education system : describe ill)provements to black institutions . including the dollar aq10unt and timetable for each improvement : elimin~ te unnecessary progmm duplication in a way consistent with strengthening the mission
of black institutions:" give priority considemtion for
placement of new progmms at black institutions: with·
hold state approval of any change that might thwart
desegregation : and establish goals for faculty desegregation and black-st udent enrollment in predominantly
white institutions.
In many respects. ·the scope of that consent decree
made the judiciary the manager of the Department of
Educati on's Office for Civil 'Rights. Although one
could argue that without such judicial involvement the
Department of Education might be less th an vigorous
in enforcing civil-rights laws . the real issue in Adams is
the scope of permissible judicial authority. The appel·
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late court 's decision in Adtmu emphasized inherent
constitutionalli .. ilations on Judicial aut hority. :rhe appeals court refus ed. as the Supreme Court had refu~ed
in its Gro•·r C iry ruling. to create its own version of
~ i vi l-right s laws' and of mechanisms fo r enforcing tl!ose
laws.
T his trend toWard judicial restraint should not be
equ ated with abdictllion by the courts of their funda·
mental rol e in r:solving conflict s. Instead. as exem plified in Grm·e C ry and Adum.t . it is a sign of the fed eml
bench 's growi ng awareness of the limits on the judiciary's role in oLr government al scheme. In the pa• t.
courts have been ~ lling both to hear lawsuits thut. for
varying reasons. were not the proper subjects for resolut ion by fede ct~l courts and to supply legislati ve judg·
ments on vague language in legislation enacted by Con·
gress.
In a mome nli of judicial candor. Skelly Wright . a
fedeml appeal~-court judge . said that judges " should
be more reluctant than we have been to fault the other
agencies of goc•ernment and also more hesitant about
filling the void when. in our judgment. the elected
branches of g;,~ernment should have acted and (lti !'ed ...
He went on tct name " one important exception: the
area of equal rii!hts for disad vantaged mihorities. As to
that . J remain~ uncompromising ·acti ~i st' ."
The Gm• ·~ Cir.l)"and Adcrm.t decisions cont md ict
Judge Wright ' • assertion: in both cases lthe court' a:·
fused to exten•• iheir authorit y to provide greater protec.tion to civil-tights interests. In the Gn,..• Ciry case.
the Supreme U>p,rt refused to supply a legt'"\fative judg·
menton vague:Congressionallegislation. t.nhe Adem~.<
case. a federa t.court of appeals similarly insisted tha t
civil-rights pla:rntiffs. like other litiga nts. must prove
that they have'S concrete interest in a lawsuit.
Those court1. by recognizing the limits on judicial
authorit)', have shifted the focu s of civil-rights reform
in higher educOltion to the elected branches of government. where iulbelongs. Under the princi ple of sepam·
tion ofpowers ~Jcoun s ..are supposed to resolve concrete
dispu ~ s. not ~>~rite laws or implement polic y. Donald
Horowitz. a I3W prOfessor at Duke Universit y. has
pointed out thai the couns' necessary concentration on
individual cases. which limi ts their capac it y for ascertaining the social relevance of the facts . " unfi ts the
courts for mucil of the importa nt wo rk of the government. "
Congress and the executive
brdnch will prove to be capable munag<rs of civil·rights reform in higher education is an open question. The amount of
pubiic scrutin) of Congress during its failed effort to
respond legi s l ~tivel y to the Gn11 •~ Ciry decision suggests that the elected branches will be held accounta ble
for their actio n:S Cor inaction ). Although such accountability does no<J guamntee that Congress and the executive bmnch wil handle civil-rights issues in higher edu·
cation respon Si bly. our government was founded o n
the belief that the elected bra nches would . over time.
address public-poiicy concerns in a r~spon sible man·
ner. The Grm"f! Ci"· and Adams decisions reflect. that
belief and rettrn thi: issue of civjliJghts lin higher ed ucation to the o ran~ hes of govCMm'enl Properly concerned with pdticymaking.
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